Ten years ago a small business's IT was a cupboard with a server in it. Today it is a login page. Email, files, accounting, payroll, the CRM, the phone system, the backups: most of it runs on someone else's computers, reached through a browser.
Cyber Essentials caught up with that some time ago, and in a way that trips people up. The scheme is explicit that cloud services are always in scope, it asks you to list every one you use, and one of its three automatic fails is a cloud question. At the same time, the five controls mean something different for a service you rent than for a laptop you own.
This article sets out what counts as a cloud service, which of the five controls are the provider's job and which are yours, and how to answer the MFA question without failing on it. The NCSC requirements are the authoritative source; check anything here against them.
What counts as a cloud service
The scheme's definition is broader than "we use the cloud" usually means. A cloud service is one that is:
- on demand and scalable, so you pay for what you use rather than running it;
- hosted on shared infrastructure you do not control;
- reached over the internet, through an account;
- and it stores or processes your organisation's data.
That covers the obvious (Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, Dropbox, Xero, HubSpot) and the less obvious: the payroll portal, the online backup, the website host, the e-signature tool, the project board, the video-calling service, the virtual server you rent to run an old application. If staff log into it for work and it holds anything of yours, it counts.
Watch out: cloud services cannot be excluded from scope. You can, in some circumstances, certify a subset of your organisation, but every cloud service that subset uses stays in, and the questionnaire asks you to list them all. A list that misses the accountant's portal is a wrong answer, not a small one.
Three models, and who does what
How much of each control is yours depends on how much of the stack you control. The scheme uses the three standard models:
- Software as a service (SaaS): you use an application the provider runs. Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, Xero, Salesforce.
- Platform as a service (PaaS): you deploy your own code or data onto a platform the provider runs. A managed database, a web app host, a function platform.
- Infrastructure as a service (IaaS): you rent virtual machines, storage and networks and run whatever you like on them. A Windows server in Azure or AWS is a server; it just lives elsewhere.
| Control | SaaS | PaaS | IaaS |
|---|---|---|---|
| Firewalls | Provider runs the boundary; you protect admin access | Provider, mostly; you set any exposure of your app | Yours: the virtual firewall and the rules on it |
| Secure configuration | Shared: the provider secures the service, you set the tenant | Shared: the platform is theirs, your deployment is yours | Yours: the operating system and everything on it |
| User access control | Yours: accounts, MFA, admin roles, leavers | Yours | Yours |
| Malware protection | Provider, for the service; your devices are still yours | Shared | Yours: protection on each virtual machine |
| Security updates | Provider patches the service; you patch what reaches it | Provider patches the platform; you patch your code's dependencies | Yours: every operating system and application, within 14 days |
Two things stand out. User access control is yours under every model, because nobody else can decide who in your organisation gets an account, whether MFA is on, or when a leaver loses access. And a rented virtual machine carries exactly the obligations of a physical one: supported operating system, patches within 14 days, malware protection, a firewall. Moving a server to the cloud moves the hardware, not the responsibility.
Tip: the requirements document carries the scheme's own table of responsibility by model. When you are unsure which column you are in, that table is the final word, not the provider's marketing page.
The five controls, in the cloud
Firewalls
For SaaS, the provider runs the boundary and you cannot touch it. Your part is the way in for administrators: the admin console must sit behind MFA and must not be reachable from anywhere with a password alone. For IaaS, the virtual network and its firewall rules are yours. "It's in the cloud" does not mean a server can be left listening to the whole internet; the default-deny rule applies to a security group exactly as it applies to a router.
Secure configuration
A new Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace tenant is not configured the way the scheme expects; it is configured the way the provider ships it. Switching off older sign-in methods that bypass MFA, deciding who can share files outside the organisation, removing guest accounts nobody uses, disabling apps nobody asked for: these are configuration choices, and they are yours. For a rented server, everything the secure-configuration control says about a physical one applies unchanged.
User access control
This is the control that does not move whichever model you use. Every person has their own account on every service. Administrators of the tenant use separate accounts for that work and ordinary accounts for email. Leavers are removed from the cloud directory the day they leave, which also removes them from everything that signs in through it. And multi-factor authentication is on for every user, on every service that offers it.
In the tender: "the supplier must hold a valid Cyber Essentials certificate" does not say anything about the cloud, and does not need to. Every service you use is inside the certificate's scope automatically.
Malware protection
For SaaS, the provider filters the service's mail and scans its files; that is their part. It does not change the requirement on your side: protection on, updating and scanning on every laptop, desktop and phone that reaches the service. The attachment the filter missed still lands on a device. For a rented virtual machine, malware protection on the machine is yours to install and keep current.
Security update management
The provider patches the SaaS application; you never see it happen. What reaches the application is yours: browsers, operating systems, office applications and phones, with high and critical updates within 14 days. On IaaS, the operating system and every application on the virtual machine are yours, within the same 14 days. On PaaS, your own code's dependencies are yours, and an old library in a deployed web app is the same kind of finding as an old application on a laptop.
The MFA question that fails you
Three questions in the assessment are automatic fails: two about the 14-day patching window, and one about cloud services. The cloud one asks you to list any service you use that offers no MFA option. If you list a service as having no MFA option when it does, the assessment fails.
That is a question of fact, checkable against the provider's own documentation, and it catches organisations that answered from memory. Three steps avoid it:
- Check every service, not the ones you remember. The list from the start of this article is the list to check. For each, find the provider's own page on multi-factor or two-step verification.
- Separate "available" from "on". The scheme asks both: does the service offer MFA, and is it enforced for administrators and for users. A service with MFA available but switched on only for the directors is a non-compliant answer on the second question, not the first.
- Use the linked sign-in where there is no native MFA. Some services have no MFA of their own but let you sign in through your Microsoft or Google account, or another identity provider, that does. Where that link exists, the scheme expects it to be configured. "No MFA option" is only a true answer when neither the native option nor a linked one exists.
Example: a small practice uses an industry-specific booking system with no MFA setting of its own. Its vendor supports "Sign in with Microsoft". Linking it to the practice's Microsoft 365 tenant, where MFA is enforced, brings the booking system inside MFA without the vendor adding a feature. Listing it as "no MFA option" would have been both wrong and a fail.
Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace in practice
Most UK SMEs run on one of the two, and both can satisfy every cloud-side control when configured. In both, the work is the same four jobs: enforce MFA for every account, with no exceptions for service accounts that a person logs into; create separate administrator accounts and keep the everyday ones unprivileged; switch off the older sign-in methods that skip MFA; and review guest and external sharing settings so data does not leave by default.
Neither platform does any of this for you out of the box. Both make it a few settings once you know they exist, and both show you, in their admin centres, which accounts still lack MFA. That report is your evidence.
How a guided platform helps here
Scope is where cloud work goes wrong, and it goes wrong early: the accountant's portal nobody mentioned, the booking tool a department bought, the virtual server from a project three years ago. A guided readiness check asks for every service by category, keeps the list in one place, records for each whether MFA is available and enforced, and flags where a service known to offer MFA has been answered "no". The judgement about your own systems stays with you; what you get is a list that does not depend on anyone's memory, and a prompt where an answer is about to fail you.
Decide what is yours, then do it
Write down every cloud service. For each, decide which model it is and read off which controls are yours. Turn MFA on everywhere it exists, link what has no MFA of its own, separate the admin accounts, fix the tenant defaults, and treat every rented server as the server it is. That is the cloud part of Cyber Essentials, and for most small businesses it is most of Cyber Essentials.